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4CHINA’S NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE AND MODERNIZATION
Since the country’s ﬁ rst nuclear test in 1964, the nu-
clear policies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
have been strikingly diff erent from those of the super-
powers. Despite the superior nuclear ﬁ repower of the 
U.S. and Russia, Beijing has maintained a relatively 
small arsenal whose role appears to have been exclusi-
vely retaliatory. Throughout the Cold War and beyond, 
China’s leadership has also maintained a pledge of 
absolute no-ﬁ rst-use (NFU) of nuclear weapons, and 
held its nuclear forces at a low alert level.
At the same time, China’s nuclear forces are currently 
undergoing a major modernization eff ort. In recent ye-
ars, there have been some important breakthroughs, 
leading to the deployment of a new generation of In-
tercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and ballistic 
missile submarines (SSBN). These developments are 
followed closely in the Asia-Paciﬁ c region and beyond, 
and are increasingly causing concern among China’s 
neighbors. Some analysts are arguing that China is 
about to break with its traditional nuclear force posture 
and initiate a major nuclear build-up, possibly trigge-
ring an arms race in the region.
I set out in this paper to analyze China’s policy of 
d eterrence and nuclear force modernization. First, I 
describe China’s traditional nuclear posture and the 
strategic rationale that has guided the development 
and deployment of its strategic forces. Second, I ana-
lyze current modernization eff orts, and to what extent 
they remain in line with China’s traditional nuclear 
stance. Finally, I point to some potential challenges li-
kely to face China’s deterrent in the future linked with 
changes in U.S. nuclear posture and the deployment 
of missile defense systems. I outline how China has so 
far chosen to respond to these challenges, and discuss 
how the country may opt to respond in the future.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA’S NUCLEAR ARSENAL
The exact size and speciﬁ cs of the strategic weapons 
force of the PRC remain unknown, as China has tra-
ditionally been highly secretive about the development 
and deployment of its nuclear forces. However, it is ge-
nerally acknowledged that China’s nuclear arsenal has 
remained relatively limited since its ﬁ rst nuclear test 
in 1964. While estimates diff er, most analysts con-
cur that the Chinese nuclear stockpile is currently in 
the range of 80–200 operationally deployed nuclear 
warheads. This has not changed signiﬁ cantly in recent 
years (Lewis 2007, 25; Carnegie Endowment for In-
ternational Peace 2009; Kile et al. 2010, 353).1 In 
contrast, even aft er signiﬁ cant cuts in the post-Cold 
War era, the U.S. recently declared that it keeps 5,113 
nuclear warheads in its stockpile, as well as “several 
thousand” retired warheads waiting to be dismant-
led (D epartment of Defense 2010). Russia is believed 
to have more than 11,000 strategic and nonstrategic 
warheads either in storage, retired, or waiting to be dis-
mantled (Kristensen and Norris 2011). 
In addition to being relatively small, the Chinese nu-
clear force has long remained the most technologically 
unsophisticated of those of the ﬁ ve recognized nuclear 
states. It has also arguably been relatively vulnerable, 
with Western analysts questioning whether China has 
had a reliable second-strike capability (Lieber and Press 
2006, 7–8; Saunders and Yuan 2006, 84). Until re-
cently, the backbone of China’s arsenal has been a force 
of approximately 20 DF-5 ICBMs, the only missiles in 
the Chinese inventory that could reach the continental 
United States. The silo-based, liquid-fueled DF-5 has 
been claimed to be vulnerable to a ﬁ rst nuclear strike or 
high-precision conventional strike (Fravel and Medeiros 
2010, 54; Lewis and Hua 1992, 24–25).2 The missi-
les are also believed to be kept un-fueled, off -alert, and 
with their warheads stored separately, which exacerba-
tes vulnerability by increasing preparation time (Lewis 
2007, 1; Norris and Kristensen 2008, 43). 
China has continued to rely heavily on land-based sys-
tems; the air-based and sea-based components of its 
nuclear forces have been relatively underdeveloped (Gill, 
Mulvenon, and Stokes 2002, 536). The Chinese stra-
tegic bomber force is believed to be vulnerable, and is 
not seen as a credible threat to adversaries with modern 
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. . = not available or not applicable; ( ) = uncertain ﬁ gure; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic
missile.
a Aircraft  range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary.
b China deﬁ nes missile ranges as short-range, <1000 km; medium-range, 1000–3000 km;
long-range, 3000–8000 km; and intercontinental range, >8000 km.
c The range of the DF-3A may be greater than is normally reported.
d The DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2) variant is believed to have a range of up to 2500 km.
e Figures for aircraft  are for nuclear-conﬁ gured versions only.
f The DH-10, which is also known by the Chinese designation CJ-10, may have a nuclear
role. It is apparently employable from H-6 bombers and ground-based launchers.
g Additional warheads are thought to be in storage to arm future DF-31, DF-31A and JL-2
missiles. The total stockpile is believed to comprise c. 240–300 warheads.
TABLE 1: Reproduced from SIPRI 2010 yearbook (Kile et.al 2010, 354).
Type/Chinese designation (NATO 
designation)
No. 
deployed
Year ﬁ rst 
deployed
Range 
(km)a
Warhead 
loading
No. of 
warheads
Land-based missilesb 134
DF-3A (CSS-2) 12 1971 3,100c 1 x 3.3 Mt 12
DF-4 (CSS-3) 12 1980 5,500 1 x 3.3 Mt 12
DF-5A (CSS-4) 20 1981 13,000 1 x 4–5 Mt 20
DF-21 (CSS-5) 60 1991 2,100d 1 x 200–300 kt 60
DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1) ~15 2006 >7,200 1 x . . 15
DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) ~15 2007 >11,200 1 x . . 15
SLBMs (36)
JL-1 (CSS-N-3) (12) 1986 >1,770 1 x 200–300 kt (12)
JL-2 (CSS-NX-14) (24) (2010) >7,200 1 x . . (24)
Aircrafte >20
H-6 (B-6) 20 1965 3 100 1 x bomb (20)
Attack (. .) .. 1972-.. .. 1 x bomb (20)
Cruise missiles 150–350 ..
DH-10 150–350 2007 >1500 1 x . . ..f
Total (~200)g
6air defense systems. Furthermore, China does not 
seem to prioritize improving its capabilities in this 
area (Yuan 2007, 293). While its SSBN force has 
been under development since 1958, it has enco-
untered numerous technical setbacks and progress 
has been very slow. Until recently, Beijing possessed 
only a single Xia-class SSBN, which was launched 
in 1985. The Xia-class submarine has been fraught 
with problems, and has supposedly rarely left  port 
and never conducted a deterrent patrol (Kristensen, 
Norris, and McKinzie 2006, 79; Yuan 2007, 292).
Unlike the U.S. and Russia, China never developed 
any major inventory of tactical nuclear weapons for 
war-ﬁ ghting purposes either. According to some 
Western analysts, China has no tactical nuclear 
weapons of any kind, only strategic weapons for re-
taliatory use (Lewis 2007, 1). Others have argued 
that the PRC probably maintains an inventory of 
tactical nuclear warheads for use with ﬁ ghter-bom-
ber aircraft , and may also have developed nuclear 
warheads for short-range missiles as well as nu-
clear land-mines. However, these analysts also point 
out that this inventory is likely to be relatively small 
(Kristensen, Norris, and McKinzie 2006, 98).
FIGURE 1. Range of China’s Medium Range and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. US Department of Defense, 2010. 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010, 35.
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What led China to develop this speciﬁ c nuclear pos-
ture? Why has China maintained a small, unsophis-
ticated and relatively vulnerable arsenal, instead of 
developing a larger, more diverse and more credible 
nuclear deterrent? 
From the outset, the limited size and lack of diver-
sity of China’s nuclear forces represented a delibe-
rate choice by the Chinese leadership. While lack 
of resources may have constrained China during 
the Maoist age and limited the leadership’s options 
(Goldstein 2000; Hua 1998, 61), the PRC has had 
the possibility of developing a much larger arsenal, 
at least since the 1980s (Johnston 1996, 548; 
Roberts, Manning, and Montaperto 2000, 57).3 
In other words, at least for the past three decades 
China has chosen to constrain the development of 
its strategic forces.
The most common explanation off ered for this re-
straint is that China pursues a policy of “minimum 
deterrence” (Chu and Rong 2008; Huang 2001; 
Lewis 2007; Roberts, Manning, and Montaperto 
2000). This concept has been deﬁ ned as “threate-
ning the lowest level of damage necessary to prevent 
attack, with the fewest number of nuclear weapons 
possible” (Committee on the U.S.-Chinese Glossary 
of Nuclear Security Terms 2008, 36). With such a 
strategy, a small number of warheads able to inﬂ ict 
“unacceptable damage” to a handful of enemy ur-
ban-industrial centers constitute a credible deterrent 
(Huang 2001, 40–41).
The Chinese leadership’s belief in the suffi  ciency of 
a small nuclear force was apparent already in the 
early periods of China’s nuclear program. The Chi-
nese leadership’s decision to build nuclear weapons 
was largely a response to repeated threats of nuclear 
attack from the U.S. during the 1950s. In order to 
“frustrate nuclear blackmail” and deter adversaries 
from launching a nuclear attack on China, the Chi-
nese leadership during the Maoist period held that a 
limited retaliatory capability would be adequate (Le-
wis and Xue 1996, 232–233). A large arsenal was 
not considered necessary, as nuclear weapons were 
deemed to be psychological and political instru-
ments, rather than weapons for war-ﬁ ghting (Yuan 
2007, 276). The belief in limited military utility of 
nuclear weapons has endured to this day, and conti-
nues to inﬂ uence China’s nuclear policies.
That nuclear weapons were seen mainly as instru-
ments of retaliation helps explain another feature of 
Chinese nuclear strategy, namely the country’s pled-
ge of no-ﬁ rst-use. Immediately aft er its ﬁ rst nuclear 
test on October 16, 1964, China declared that it 
“will never at any time or under any circumstances 
be the ﬁ rst to use nuclear weapons” (Statement of 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China, 
October 16, 1964). China has continued to uphold 
this pledge, and routinely pressed for other states to 
make similar declarations.
A number of political and economic factors also 
seem to have contributed to the Chinese policy of 
nuclear restraint and holding internal voices calling 
for a more aggressive nuclear posture at bay (Johns-
ton 1996).4 For the last two decades, building an 
image as a “responsible major power” and avoiding 
fear among its neighbors over its rapidly increasing 
international clout have been central concerns for 
China’s leaders. A major nuclear buildup could un-
settle this image and prove damaging politically, and 
both foreign and Chinese analysts have pointed out 
that Beijing wants to avoid such costs (Huang 2001, 
48; Saunders and Yuan 2006, 103; Zhu 2005, 
212). In addition, with economic growth being their 
overarching priority since the late 1970s, Chinese 
leaders seem to have been concerned with avoiding 
excessive spending on nuclear weapons (Gu and 
Nie 1999, 275). This idea was reinforced in China 
aft er the collapse of the Soviet Union, which many 
Chinese experts attributed partly to bloated military 
budgets and the arms race with the United States 
(Shambaugh 2008, 76–77).
8CHINA’S NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION
While China’s calculus has remained remarkably 
stable over time, the country is continually moder-
nizing and upgrading its nuclear arsenal. In recent 
years, these modernization eff orts have led to signi-
ﬁ cant improvements in China’s nuclear forces. First, 
with the deployment of the new DF-31 and DF-
31A missiles in 2006 and 2007, China obtained 
a road-mobile, solid-propellant ICBM force able to 
replace the older silo-based, liquid-fueled systems. 
The deployment of these new missiles will be im-
portant for the reliability and credibility of China’s 
nuclear arsenal, as they are much less vulnerable to 
conventional and nuclear strikes than older systems. 
Second, with the launch of the Jin-class SSBN in 
2004, China is one step closer to having a credible 
sea-based deterrent. One submarine is reported to 
have entered into service, with two more apparently 
being outﬁ tted. While it is unclear how many new 
SSBNs China plans to build, the U.S. Department 
of Defense considers that China “may ﬁ eld up to ﬁ ve 
new SSBNs” (2010, 3).
The Chinese modernization program is being 
w atched closely by neighboring states and has, un-
surprisingly, led to speculations about Beijing’s in-
tentions. The recent deployment of new ICBMs and 
SSBNs has led analysts in the U.S. to believe that 
China’s nuclear rationale is about to change. Some 
even argue that China is presently conducting a ma-
jor nuclear buildup and seeking to develop a war-
ﬁ ghting capability (Schneider 2009).
That notwithstanding, rather than representing a 
dramatic shift  in China’s nuclear calculus, the cur-
rent modernization of its nuclear force seems to be 
driven by an ambition to strengthen the credibility of 
its traditional posture of minimum deterrence. The-
se eff orts can be traced back to the 1990s, when 
Chinese strategists became increasingly concerned 
with the importance of ensuring a reliable second-
strike capability (Interview with arms control expert, 
Shanghai, May 10, 2010). According to Evan Med-
eiros, these concerns led many in China to believe 
the country needed to “move towards a credible and 
visible minimum deterrent that relies on the mobi-
lity, invulnerability, and penetrability of its nuclear 
forces” (2007, 54).
Several factors support the notion that the purpo-
se of China’s nuclear modernization program is to 
develop a small but secure and survivable nuclear 
force. First of all, there are so far few signs of any 
major quantitative expansion of the Chinese arse-
nal. Nor is it given that the size of the arsenal will 
increase in the future. According to a study by the 
Federation of American Scientists, in the next de-
cade the number of deployed nuclear weapons is 
likely to remain s table while the total megatonnage 
in the Chinese arsenal could very well decline, as 
China retires older missiles and replaces them with 
DF-31s and DF-31As that carry smaller warheads 
(Kristensen, Norris, and McKinzie 2006, 42–46). 
What is also i nteresting to note is that China seems 
to have chosen not to implement Multiple Indepen-
dently T argetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) techno-
logy – whereby each missile is equipped with several 
warheads – even though it probably has the ability 
to do this (Kristensen, Norris, and McKinzie 2006, 
54). MIRVing its missiles would arguably also have 
been an indication of willingness to move away from 
nuclear minimalism. In short, China seems to be 
stressing survivability rather than quantity and com-
plexity in its nuclear modernization.
Second, China’s offi  cial declaratory policy has re-
mained largely unchanged. In its most recent go-
vernment white paper on national defense, China 
continues to guarantee its adherence to the policy 
of no-ﬁ rst-use “at any time and in any circumstan-
ces”, and will continue to refrain from entering into 
arms races. It has “always exercised the utmost re-
straint in the development of nuclear weapons” and 
“will limit its nuclear capabilities to the minimum 
level required for national security” (Information Of-
ﬁ ce of the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China 2010). While some dismiss such points as 
government propaganda, declaratory policies matter 
inasmuch as they signal intent to other countries and 
inﬂ uence and shape the plans of military leaders (Sa-
gan 2009, 177). China’s leaders would likely have 
9introduced certain rhetorical shift s if they had wan-
ted to change the country’s nuclear posture drama-
tically. The lack of such changes further underscores 
the continuity in China’s nuclear calculus.
Third, China is modernizing its delivery vehicles, but 
does not seem to be developing new warheads. Chi-
na has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
and has not tested nuclear weapons since 1996. 
For a nuclear weapons state, developing new “nu-
clear package” concepts such as miniaturized war-
heads is much more diffi  cult with a test ban in place 
(D ahlman, Mykkeltveit, and Haak 2009, 15). Lack 
of previous testing data exacerbates this problem, 
and of the legally recognized nuclear weapons states, 
China is the country with the least amount of tes-
ting data at its disposal. If Beijing wanted to initiate 
a major nuclear buildup and break with its minimum 
deterrence policy, resuming nuclear testing in order 
to develop new warheads would probably be prefe-
rable. So far, however, there are no signs that China 
is preparing to break with its treaty obligations (Gill 
2000; Johnston 1996; National Academy of Scien-
ces 2002; Zou 1998).
In sum, the recent deployment of new ICBMs and 
SSBNs does mark an important evolution, and will 
give a signiﬁ cant boost to the credibility of China’s 
nuclear force. However, there are few indications that 
it represents a radical break with its “minimum de-
terrence” posture or the initiation of a major nuclear 
buildup program. In fact, the deployment of the new 
systems will probably strengthen China’s conﬁ dence 
in the suffi  ciency of a small arsenal. By improving 
survivability, China can maintain a relatively l imited 
nuclear force with conﬁ dence in its d eterrence ca-
pability. Without such qualitative improvements, 
China would perhaps have found a larger arsenal to 
be necessary to ensure its second-strike capability 
(Li 2001).5 
FUTURE CHALLENGES TO CHINA’S STRATEGY AND POSTURE
While there are currently few signs of any major 
changes in China’s nuclear rationale, Beijing’s nu-
clear posture is facing a set of increasingly serious 
challenges. In particular, these challenges stem from 
recent developments in the nuclear posture and de-
claratory policy of the U.S., and what some analysts 
have termed the latter’s growing “nuclear primacy” 
(Lieber and Press 2006). China sees the U.S. as its 
main potential great power adversary. In the medium 
to long term, these changes in U.S. posture could 
produce a strong response in Beijing and lead to 
changes in China’s nuclear policies.
The issue that has sparked the greatest controversy 
is U.S. missile defense plans. With the Missile De-
fense Act of 1999, the U.S. Congress made it of-
ﬁ cial policy to deploy such a system “as soon as it is 
technologically possible” (1999). When George W. 
Bush took offi  ce as president, the funding of the mis-
sile defense programs was also substantially increa-
sed. In 2002, the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) to remove 
the legal obstacles to missile defense deployment, a 
move that undermined many Chinese experts’ belief 
in U.S. willingness to commit to international arms 
control (interview with arms control expert, Beijing, 
June 29, 2010).
Even though Washington has tried to persuade the 
Chinese on numerous occasions that the missile 
defense system is not directed against the PRC, the 
Chinese are not convinced, and have argued that 
such programs will be “detrimental to international 
strategic balance and stability” (Information Offi  ce of 
the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 
2010). Chinese experts have claimed that the mis-
sile defense could challenge China’s deterrent. For 
example, Professor Li Bin notes that the U.S. would 
not dare to launch a ﬁ rst strike against China’s small 
arsenal without missile defenses in place, because it 
would always have to worry that a few ICBMs could 
survive and be launched as retaliation. With a missi-
le defense, however, the American public would po-
tentially have “the illusion that the several surviving 
retaliatory Chinese ICBMs would be intercepted by 
the [missile defense] system”, which could promote 
nuclear risk-taking from the U.S. (Li 2001). Other 
Chinese scholars have even argued that the mis-
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sile defense plans are part of a U.S. scheme to trick 
China into an expensive arms race that will ruin its 
economy, just as the U.S. did with the Soviet Union 
(Shi 2000). Few accept the notion that a missile de-
fense system is merely defensive (Urayama 2004, 
125).
Nevertheless, the Chinese reaction to U.S. missile 
defense eff orts has been relatively measured so far. 
According to some analysts in the U.S., this is be-
cause China does not have to change its posture sig-
niﬁ cantly in order to overcome a U.S. missile defense 
system, as the country has had an advanced program 
developing countermeasures for decades. Further-
more, the current nuclear modernization programs 
“will be suffi  cient to overcome threats posed by the 
most plausible combination of U.S. off ensive and 
defensive strategic systems” (Lewis 2007, 154).6 
Many Chinese experts seem to have reached similar 
conclusions, believing that time is on China’s side, 
and that an eff ective missile defense system that co-
uld threaten China’s deterrent may not even be tech-
nologically feasible (Urayama 2004, 124; Li, Zhou, 
and Liu 2001). These latter conclusions ﬁ nd sup-
port in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review 
Report, which states clearly that the currently de-
ployed U.S. system of 30 ground-based interceptors 
(GBI) “does not have the capacity to cope with large 
scale Russian or Chinese missile attacks, and is not 
intended to aff ect the strategic balance with those 
countries” (Department of Defense 2010, 13). Nor 
are there any current plans to deploy more GBIs, the 
report adds.
At the same time, Chinese analysts are still unease 
at the prospect of unanticipated major technologi-
WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES 2011
Country Year of ﬁ rst 
nuclear test
Deployd warheads Other warheads Total
United States 1945 2150 6350 ~ 8500
Russia 1949 2427 8570 ~ 11 000
United Kingdom 1952 160 65 225
France 1960 290 10 ~ 300
China 1964 -- 200 ~ 240
India 1974 -- 80-100 80-100
Pakistan 1998 -- 90-110 90-110
Israel -- -- 80 80
North Korea 2006 -- -- ?
Total ~ 5027 ~ 15 500 ~ 20 530
TABLE 2: Reproduced from SIPRI 2011 Yearbook (Kile et al. 2011, 320).
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cal breakthroughs in the future (Li, Zhou, and Liu 
2001). While the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense 
Review Report points out that those capabilities that 
have been proven to work will be prioritized, resear-
ch in more advanced systems continues. U.S. plans 
to improve the so-called standard missile 3 (SM-3) 
interceptors may also worry Beijing. At the moment, 
the SM-3 is only capable of intercepting short and 
medium range ballistic missiles. However, there are 
plans to upgrade the missile and deploy it on both 
sea- and land-based sites. By 2020, the U.S. hopes 
to ﬁ eld the Block IIB upgrade of the missile, which is 
supposed to have the capability to intercept ICBMs 
during early stages of their ﬂ ights. That the SM-3 is 
being developed in cooperation with Japan, is hardly 
comforting to Beijing.
For these reasons, it should not be taken for granted 
that Beijing will not consider more drastic responses. 
In fact, the missile defense eff orts have arguably al-
ready triggered a Chinese reaction, one with a likely 
negative eff ect on strategic stability. In 2007, China 
tested an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapon, shooting 
down an aging weather satellite with a ground-
launched ballistic missile. This was met with inter-
national condemnation, because of the potential for 
harmful debris, and because it was seen as an event 
that could trigger an arms race in space. A large part 
of the rationale for the test, however, was probably to 
develop an asymmetric response to the U.S. missile 
defense system. For a missile defense system with 
sensors based in space, ASAT weapons constitute a 
relatively cheap, reliable and eff ective countermea-
sure (Hui 2004, 116).
That China will initiate a signiﬁ cant nuclear buildup 
as a reply to U.S. missile defense plans does not 
seem likely, but cannot be ruled out. Professor Shen 
Dingli has noted that China “might expand and 
MIRV its strategic missile forces to a total number 
of deployed warheads ten times higher than current 
levels” (2001). Professor Li Bin, while advocating 
the development of  less politically costly penetration 
aids placed on missiles as a countermeasure, has ar-
gued that “the buildup option is so mathematically 
simple to understand and so certain to work” and 
may “easily win some support from non-technical 
people” (Li 2001; see also Li, Zhou, and Liu 2001). 
Similarly, Chinese expert Sun Xiangli has argued that 
while China seeks to maintain a small arsenal, the 
number is not ﬁ xed, as China will need a suffi  cient 
number of missiles to penetrate an adversary’s mis-
sile defenses aft er a ﬁ rst strike (Sun 2006). Thus, 
China is probably hedging its bets, and keeping the 
possibility of a nuclear buildup open.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have explained why China’s nuclear 
calculus has remained very diff erent from those of 
the U.S. and Russia. Chinese leaders see nuclear 
weapons mainly as political artifacts with limited mi-
litary utility, and have deemed a small strategic force 
suffi  cient to deter any adversary. This belief seems 
to have guided the development and deployment of 
China’s nuclear forces throughout the Cold War and 
beyond.
Currently, there are few signs of any imminent chan-
ge in this calculus. Even though China is upgrading 
and improving its arsenal, and has achieved major 
breakthroughs in recent years, the motivation for its 
modernization eff orts seems to be to strengthen the 
credibility and reliability of its small nuclear arsenal. 
As of now, there are no signs of a major quantitative 
nuclear buildup. Furthermore, China’s declaratory 
policy remains largely unchanged, and there are no 
indications that China is planning to resume nuclear 
testing. In sum, China’s nuclear policies are charac-
terized by remarkable continuity.
Nevertheless, I have indicated that China’s nuclear 
posture is facing a set of increasingly serious chal-
lenges. Particularly, U.S. missile defense plans have 
caused worry among Chinese strategists and leaders, 
as it is seen as a potential threat to China’s deterren-
12
ce capability. While China has not reacted by depar-
ting from its minimalist nuclear posture as yet, more 
drastic responses could follow if the U.S. manages to 
deploy a large and eff ective missile defense system.
If U.S. missile defense eff orts cause China to launch 
a major nuclear buildup, it could have serious ef-
fect on the strategic balance in Asia. An Indian re-
sponse to a Chinese buildup is not unlikely, which 
could again cause Pakistan to react. In addition, the 
missile defense eff orts could have serious repercus-
sions on international arms control. As pointed out, 
China so far appears to have adopted a “wait and 
see” attitude toward the missile defense plans. Given 
this attitude and the perception that a more drastic 
response could be necessary at some future stage, 
China is likely to be less willing to agree to arms con-
trol measures than it would have been without the 
missile defense in place.
ENDNOTES
1 Sipri also estimates that China has some 40 warheads in reserve or awaiting dismantlement, making the total 
stockpile approximately 240 warheads.
2 According to Fravel and Medeiros, as compared to China’s other missiles, the DF-5s were “even more vulnerable to 
a ﬁ rst strike because they were based in ﬁ xed silos, and their three-stage propulsion system had particularly exten-
sive and dangerous fueling requirements”. Lewis and Hua claim that Chinese nuclear engineers have described the 
silos of the DF-5s as “missile tombs”.
3 In terms of delivery vehicles, Roberts et al. claim that China has the ability build up to a thousand missiles in a de-
cade, including 10-12 ICBMs per year. In 1996, Johnston claimed China had the capability to enlarge its arsenal 
2–3 times, as it has suffi  cient ﬁ ssile material to produce more warheads, and the ability to produce more delivery 
vehicles.
4 As Johnston’s study shows, not everyone in China has been content with the strategic doctrine of “minimum deter-
rence” and the reliance on a small arsenal. Since the late 1980s, as China’s technological and economic muscles 
have been growing, a growing number of Chinese nuclear strategists have allegedly argued in favor of moving 
toward what they term “limited deterrence”. A strategic doctrine based on this concept would require “suffi  cient 
counterforce and counter-value tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear forces to deter the escalation of conventional 
or nuclear war.” This would further require China to undertake a major nuclear build-up and develop a more diverse 
nuclear force structure, i.e. better command, control and communications and intelligence (C3I) systems; missile 
defenses; and anti-satellite weapons. However, so far, voices arguing in favor of a more aggressive Chinese nuclear 
posture and strategy have not been able to win the support of the central leadership. 
5 Chinese expert Li Bin made this point explicitly before the deployment of the DF-31 and the DF-31A. If China de-
velops road-mobile and more survivable ICBMs, Li claimed, it would not need to deploy a large number of missiles 
to ensure the credibility of its arsenal. However, if it had to rely on older silo-based and more vulnerable missiles, it 
would perhaps have had to initiate a buildup to be conﬁ dent in its second-strike capability.
6 While not being a response to missile defense plans, China’s deployment of solid-propellant ICBMs and a new 
SSBN force will boost its conﬁ dence in the survivability and penetration capability of its deterrent, and limit con-
cerns that the U.S. could eliminate most of China’s strategic force without fear of retaliation. 
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